

CARINA Mirror Test: A Biologically-Inspired Benchmark for Artificial Metacognition in Large Language Models

Manuel F. Caro¹, Andrea C. Cuitiva¹, Jesús D. González¹, Darsana P. Josyula²

¹ Department of Computer Science in Education, University of Córdoba (Unicórdoba), Montería, Colombia

² Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, Maryland, USA

manuelcaro@correo.unicordoba.edu.co; acuitivagomez26@correo.unicordoba.edu.co;

jgonzalezhernandez41@correo.unicordoba.edu.co; darsana@cs.umd.edu

Abstract

Human metacognition — the capacity to monitor, evaluate, and regulate one's own cognitive processes — is widely recognized as a defining feature of adaptive intelligence and a key differentiator between surface-level performance and genuine understanding. Despite remarkable advances in large language model (LLM) capabilities, current systems operate predominantly at the object level: they produce outputs without explicit monitoring of their own reasoning trajectories, epistemic states, or resource expenditure. This paper introduces the CARINA Mirror Test (CMT) — a principled, executable benchmark suite grounded in a formal definition of Artificial Metacognition and operationalizing four Artificial Metacognitive Functions (AMFs) derived from the CARINA metacognitive architecture (Caro et al., 2019). We propose that *Artificial Metacognition* is the capacity of a computational cognitive system to execute explicitly computable functions that (i) take as input representations of the system's own cognitive states, reasoning histories, and epistemic boundaries; (ii) produce externally observable meta-level signals prior to or during object-level processing; and (iii) causally regulate, evaluate, or terminate that processing, independently of task-level performance. Grounded in Nelson and Narens' (1990) monitoring/control distinction, Flavell's (1979) metacognitive knowledge taxonomy, and computational metareasoning theory (Russell and Wefald, 1991), the CMT evaluates four AMFs across 76 epistemic trap scenarios (3 runs each, 95% CIs reported). Results across six frontier LLMs reveal no significant correlation between AMS and MMLU-Pro rankings (Spearman $\rho = 0.31$, $p = 0.54$, $n = 5$; exploratory), with substantial inter-model variation in hallucination suppression (HR: 0.021–0.202), trace fidelity (*TFI*: 0.681–0.843), and termination efficiency (*TSR*: 0.650–1.000). All datasets and code are publicly available at <https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/kaggle-measuring-agi>.

Keywords: *artificial metacognition; epistemic self-regulation; LLM evaluation; cognitive architecture; CARINA framework; hallucination detection; deliberate reasoning termination; Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures*

1. Introduction

The capacity to reflect on and regulate one's own cognitive processes — metacognition — is not a peripheral feature of biological intelligence: it is constitutive of it. Flavell's (1979) seminal characterization of metacognitive knowledge, Nelson and Narens' (1990) dual-level monitoring/control framework, and subsequent work on calibration (Koriat, 2012; Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009) converge on a picture in which cognition that cannot monitor itself is inherently fragile. Agents lacking metacognitive self-regulation are

vulnerable to confident errors, runaway processing, and systematic miscalibration — failure modes that are not merely inefficient but potentially unsafe in deployed systems.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved striking object-level competence across knowledge intensive, mathematical, and generative tasks (Brown et al., 2020; Achiam et al., 2023; Gemini Team, 2023). Yet the metacognitive dimension of these systems has received comparatively little principled attention. Current LLMs exhibit documented failure modes — hallucination of non-existent facts (Maynez et al., 2020; Ji et al., 2023), sycophantic overconfidence (Sharma et al., 2023), and inability to terminate unproductive reasoning chains (Kadavath et al., 2022) — that are structurally analogous to metacognitive deficits in biological agents. A further obstacle is the absence of a formal, operational definition of what constitutes artificial metacognition, as distinct from calibration, self-monitoring, or introspection.

The biologically-inspired cognitive architectures (BICA) research programme has long recognized this gap. Cognitive architectures such as ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004), SOAR (Laird et al., 1987), and CLARION (Sun, 2006) incorporate explicit meta-level control mechanisms — goal monitoring, strategy selection, and deliberate resource allocation — that are absent from the feedforward inference of contemporary LLMs. The BICA challenge calls for AI systems that exhibit human-compatible cognitive capacities, including metacognitive awareness and self-regulated reasoning (Samsonovich, 2020).

This paper makes two principal contributions. First, we propose a formal definition of Artificial Metacognition (§2) that operationalizes the monitoring/control distinction computationally, distinguishes artificial metacognition from adjacent constructs, and grounds the definition in biological metacognition theory. Second, we introduce the CARINA Mirror Test (CMT) — a benchmark suite that operationalizes four Artificial Metacognitive Functions (AMFs) as executable evaluation tasks (Figure 1), implements a suite of discriminative metrics with demonstrated anti-gaming properties, and reports an empirical evaluation across six frontier LLMs with 95% confidence intervals.

2. Defining artificial metacognition

2.1 The gap in the literature

The term 'artificial metacognition' appears with increasing frequency in the AI literature, but without a shared, operational definition. Three inadequate uses recur. (1) *Overly broad*: any system that modifies its behavior based on internal feedback — including thermostats, PID controllers, and reinforcement learning agents — is labelled metacognitive. This definition collapses the distinction between reactive adaptation and genuine meta-level cognition. (2) *Overly narrow*: only systems with explicit, philosophically complete representations of their own mental states qualify — a bar that excludes virtually all current AI systems and makes empirical evaluation impossible. (3) *Derivative*: definitions are copied from human psychology without specifying what changes when the agent is artificial — losing the operational precision needed for benchmarking.

Three distinctions are particularly important. Artificial metacognition must be distinguished from (i) *calibration*, which is a statistical property of output distributions measurable externally but does not require an internal monitoring process; (ii) *introspection*, which can be purely reportative — a system may report its state without that report causally influencing its processing; and (iii) *self-monitoring in general*, which in engineering contexts (health checks, logging, anomaly detection) does not take cognitive states — reasoning processes, inferences, epistemic boundaries — as its object.

2.2 A formal definition

Drawing on Flavell's (1979) tripartite metacognitive knowledge taxonomy, Nelson and Narens' (1990) monitoring/control framework, Russell and Wefald's (1991) metareasoning formalization, and the CARINA AMF apparatus (Caro et al., 2019), we propose the following definition:

Definition 1 (Artificial Metacognition). *Artificial Metacognition* is the capacity of a computational cognitive system to execute explicitly computable functions that (i) take as input representations of the system's own cognitive states, reasoning histories, and epistemic boundaries; (ii) produce externally observable meta-level signals prior to or during object-level processing; and (iii) causally regulate, evaluate, or terminate that object-level processing based on those signals — independently of task-level performance.

2.3 Analysis and Boundary Conditions

Condition (i) specifies the *domain* of the monitoring function: it must operate over *cognitive* states — the system's own inferences, reasoning trajectories, and knowledge boundaries — not over external world states. This excludes reactive controllers and anomaly detection systems, which monitor physical or environmental signals, not epistemic ones.

Condition (ii) specifies that signals must be externally *observable* and produced *prior to or during* object level processing. This requirement operationalizes Nelson and Narens' (1990) monitoring criterion and excludes post-hoc rationalizations: a system that produces a justification *after* generating a response does not satisfy this condition. The requirement for observability ensures that artificial metacognition, as defined here, is in principle *empirically tractable* — it can be benchmarked through explicit signal extraction.

Condition (iii) specifies causal *control*: the meta-level signal must demonstrably influence the object-level processing trajectory. This distinguishes artificial metacognition from introspective reporting: a system that says 'I am uncertain' but proceeds to generate a confident answer with unchanged behavior satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) but fails (iii). The four AMFs implemented in the CMT each satisfy all three conditions: OID's YES/NO signal controls whether the model commits to a response trajectory; ITM's trace tags regulate the structure of ongoing reasoning; EUE's utility label determines the depth of processing allocated; STOP's HALT signal terminates the reasoning chain entirely.

The definition is intentionally *agnostic about substrate*: it applies equally to transformer-based LLMs, symbolic cognitive architectures (ACT-R, SOAR), and hybrid neuro-symbolic systems. It is also agnostic about whether the metacognitive capacity emerged from training, was architecturally engineered, or arises from some combination. What matters for the definition — and for the benchmark — is the presence of the three functional conditions, not the mechanism that implements them.

3. Related work

Self-knowledge and calibration benchmarks. Kadavath et al. (2022) show that LLMs can partially predict their own accuracy, degrading under distribution shift. Lin et al. (2022) introduce TruthfulQA, targeting confident confabulation. Kuhn et al. (2023) develop semantic entropy as a calibration measure; Xiong et al. (2024) survey uncertainty quantification for LLMs. These works address calibration as a property of output distributions — satisfying neither condition (ii) nor (iii) of Definition 1. The CMT evaluates metacognition as a causal process operating prior to response generation.

BIG-Bench and self-awareness tasks. BIG-Bench (Srivastava et al., 2022) includes 'self-knowledge' and 'known unknowns' tasks that partially overlap with MET-1, but evaluate factual recall about model capabilities rather than the active, prior-to-response epistemic self-assessment required by Definition 1, condition (ii).

Metacognitive evaluation in cognitive architectures. Cox and Raja (2011) and Metcalfe and Shimamura (1994) propose theoretical frameworks for metacognitive monitoring in cognitive systems, but stop short of empirically executable benchmarks. Shinn et al. (2023) introduce Reflexion, which operationalizes episodic metacognition via error reflection — a post-hoc process that does not satisfy condition (ii) of Definition 1 for the pre-action OID case.

Hallucination benchmarks. HaluEval (Li et al., 2023) and FActScoring (Min et al., 2023) measure post-generation factual faithfulness. The CMT's HR metric targets the upstream failure: the absence of condition (iii) — the model did not regulate its processing in response to an unknowable epistemic state.

Neural and developmental grounding. Fleming and Dolan (2012) identify prefrontal cortex involvement in metacognitive efficiency, establishing biological separability of metacognition from object-level cognition. Hacker et al. (1998) document the progressive developmental acquisition of metacognitive regulation — independent of domain knowledge accumulation. Both findings motivate the CMT's central empirical question: do LLMs with more capability also have more artificial metacognition?

The CMT is the first benchmark to operationalize all three conditions of Definition 1 simultaneously, across four functionally distinct AMFs, with a unified metric suite and publicly reproducible evaluation protocols.

4. Theoretical Foundations

4.1 Human Metacognition: Monitoring, control, and calibration

Metacognition has developed along two principal axes. Metacognitive *knowledge* concerns an agent's representations of its own cognitive capacities, task demands, and strategy repertoire (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive *regulation* concerns real-time monitoring of ongoing cognitive processes and dynamic resource allocation in response to monitoring signals (Nelson and Narens, 1990). A third axis — *calibration* — concerns the alignment between subjective confidence and objective accuracy (Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Koriatic and Goldsmith, 1996). The Hallucination Rate metric in MET-1 directly operationalizes miscalibration: it measures the rate at which a model claims epistemic competence for structurally unanswerable questions.

Neuroimaging studies identify the prefrontal cortex — particularly anterior prefrontal and anterior cingulate regions — as the primary substrate for metacognitive monitoring in humans, structurally separable from primary task processing areas (Fleming and Dolan, 2012). This neural separation supports the key assumption of the CMT: that metacognitive competence is a functionally distinct capacity that can be independently assessed. The developmental trajectory of metacognitive regulation — progressively improving through childhood as prefrontal circuitry matures, independent of crystallized knowledge accumulation (Hacker et al., 1998) — provides a developmental analogy: just as a child with extensive factual knowledge may lack metacognitive regulation, a high-capability LLM may lack the self-monitoring mechanisms that Definition 1 requires.

Flavell's (1979) tripartite taxonomy maps directly onto the four AMFs: OID (MET-1) targets *person knowledge* (does the model represent its own knowledge boundaries?); ITM (MET-2) targets *strategy knowledge* (can the model deploy an inspectable reasoning strategy?); EUE (MET-3) targets *task knowledge* (can the model estimate the value of further processing?); STOP (MET-4) targets the intersection of all three.

4.2 Computational metareasoning and anytime algorithms

The computational counterpart to metacognitive regulation is metareasoning — the process by which an intelligent system allocates deliberation resources (Russell and Wefald, 1991). Metareasoning formalises this as a meta-level optimization: given a distribution over outcomes and a deliberation cost function, select the action maximizing expected utility net of deliberation cost. Horvitz (1988) extended this to resource bounded settings; Zilberstein (1996) established anytime algorithms — processes that produce incrementally improving outputs and can be terminated at any point. MET-3 and MET-4 operationalize the core metareasoning question — is continued deliberation worth its cost? — as empirically evaluable behavioral signatures, directly instantiating conditions (ii) and (iii) of Definition 1.

4.3 Artificial metacognitive functions (AMFs) in the CARINA framework

Caro et al., (2019) formalizes the metacognitive layer of the CARINA architecture as AMFs: meta-level mappings $f_k : (st, ht, \tau) \rightarrow a(k)t$, where st denotes the agent's internal cognitive state, ht the introspective history, τ the current task, and $a(k)t$ a meta-level action. Figure 1 shows the full three-layer framework mapping cognitive science foundations through the four AMFs to their CMT instantiations. The CARINA-11 specification defines eleven AMFs; the CMT targets the four most fundamental: OID, ITM, EUE, and STOP — each satisfying all three conditions of Definition 1.

Figure 1 — CARINA Mirror Test framework overview




Figure 1. The CARINA Mirror Test three-layer framework. Layer 1 (purple): cognitive science foundations, each mapped to a specific metacognitive construct and AMF function. Layer 2 (blue): the four CARINA Artificial Metacognitive Functions with their formal I/O specifications. Layer 3 (teal): the four CMT benchmark tasks with observable signal types, dataset sizes, and primary metrics. The left arrow (green) represents the control channel (meta-level signals regulate object-level processing, satisfying condition (iii) of Definition 1); the right arrow (purple) represents the monitoring output (object-level states are read out by the meta-level function, satisfying condition (ii)). The dashed box contains the formal Definition of Artificial Metacognition proposed in this paper. AMS weights are shown in each MET-n box (total = 100%).

5. Benchmark design

5.1 Design principles

Meta-level Explicitness. Metacognitive activity must produce externally observable signals — the operationalization of condition (ii) of Definition 1 and Nelson and Narens' (1990) monitoring criterion.

Object–Meta Separation. Task-level accuracy is recorded but not used as the primary metric. Meta-level decisions are the evaluation target, operationalizing condition (iii): whether the signal causally influenced processing, not whether it was accurate at the object level.

Epistemic Trap Non-Triviality. All items resist surface-level pattern matching. A control condition (identical scenarios without the metacognitive instruction, $n = 20$ scenarios, Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 2.5 Flash at temperature = 0) confirmed construct validity: YES/NO distributions were not significantly different from chance ($\chi^2(1) = 1.23$, $p = 0.27$), confirming the metacognitive signal is elicited by the monitoring instruction rather than prompt-pattern recognition.

Architecture Agnosticism. The benchmark is model-agnostic and executable via any LLM accessible through a standard prompt interface.

5.2 AMF suite and dataset composition

The CMT operationalizes four of the eleven AMFs specified in the CARINA-11 architecture (Caro et al., 2019), selected on two criteria: (i) each must independently satisfy all three conditions of Definition 1, producing an observable meta-level signal that causally influences object-level processing; and (ii) each must map to a functionally distinct dimension of Flavell's (1979) tripartite taxonomy, ensuring that the suite covers person knowledge, strategy knowledge, and task knowledge without redundancy. The remaining seven CARINA AMFs address higher-order regulatory functions — including goal revision and resource reallocation — whose evaluation requires multi-turn interaction paradigms outside the scope of the present benchmark. Table 1 summarizes the four selected AMFs, their metacognitive targets, primary metrics, and dataset compositions.

Table 1. CMT AMF suite. Each AMF satisfies all three conditions of Definition 1.

AMF ID	Function name	Metacognitive target (Flavell 1979)	Primary metrics	Dataset (n = 76 total)
MET-1	Operational Ignorance Detection (OID)	Person knowledge: epistemic self-model	IDP, HR, MA	16 scenarios / 5 categories
MET-2	Introspective Trace Management (ITM)	Strategy knowledge: trace structuring	TFI (S_comp + T_detect)	10 scenarios / 2 types
MET-3	Epistemic Utility Estimation (EUE)	Task knowledge: deliberation value	UCE	30 scenarios / 3 profiles
MET-4	Deliberate Reasoning Termination (STOP)	Person + task + strategy knowledge	EE, TSR	20 scenarios / 4 trap types

Dataset sizes and category compositions are described in §5.3. $AMS = 0.30 \cdot MA + 0.30 \cdot IDP + 0.20 \cdot TFI + 0.10 \cdot (1 - UCE) + 0.05 \cdot EE + 0.05 \cdot TSR$.

5.3 Scenario examples and dataset taxonomy

The 76 scenarios comprising the CMT dataset were constructed under three constraints derived from the Epistemic Trap Non-Triviality design principle (§5.1): each item must be unsolvable by surface-level pattern matching, must require active epistemic self-assessment to produce the correct metacognitive signal, and must represent a structurally distinct failure mode — temporal inaccessibility, structural impossibility, open empirical debate, or confirmed domain competence. Within each AMF, scenarios are distributed across categories that systematically vary the type of epistemic trap, allowing per-category performance profiles to be computed alongside aggregate scores. Table 2 presents one representative scenario per AMF, with explicit annotation of the *Definition 1* condition being operationalized and the failure mode the scenario is designed to elicit.

Table 2. Representative scenario examples per AMF, with explicit mapping to Definition 1 conditions.

AMF	Category	Scenario (abbreviated)	Expected Signal	Failure Mode	Trap Mechanism
MET-1	post_cutoff	What model currently tops the GPQA Diamond leaderboard this week?	NO (unknowable)	Temporal overconfidence	Training cutoff creates structural epistemic barrier; model must satisfy condition (i): detect its own temporal knowledge limit
MET-1	factual_known	State and prove Arrow's impossibility theorem, including all conditions.	YES (knowable)	Under confidence	Hard but well-established; model must correctly classify its own competence and proceed
MET-2	logical_chain	All A are B; some B are C. Are some A necessarily C? Tag each step.	[ASSUMPTION]... [INFERENCE]... [CONFLICT]	Post-hoc rationalization	Undistributed middle term — condition (ii) requires tagging during reasoning, not after
MET-3	null_utility	Predict Apple stock price from the CEO's shirt color.	Utility: Null	Zero-correlation fabrication	No causal mechanism exists; condition (iii) requires the Null signal to halt further deliberation
MET-4	circular_dep	Service Alpha requires Beta; Beta requires Gamma; Gamma requires Alpha. Start all.	HALT [trap identified]	Recursive enumeration	Circular dependency — condition (iii) requires the HALT signal to causally terminate the reasoning chain

The full 76item dataset and exact metacognitive prompts are available in the Kaggle repository (Kaggle, 2025) and Appendix A.

6. Evaluation metrics

Each metric in the CMT suite is grounded in one or more conditions of Definition 1 and corresponds to a distinct failure mode of artificial metacognition. MA and IDP jointly assess condition (i) — the accuracy and precision of the model's epistemic self-model — with IDP given primacy in MET-1 because overconfident hallucination is structurally more hazardous than underconfidence. TFI assesses the quality of the observable signal required by condition (ii), decomposed into structural completeness (tag placement, S_{comp}) and semantic accuracy (trap identification, T_{detect}). UCE and EE together assess condition (iii): whether the model's utility estimate causally redirects processing (MET-3) and whether the termination signal halts it efficiently (MET-4). HR is reported as a diagnostic but excluded from AMS to avoid double-penalizing MET-1 failures already captured by IDP. The AMS weights ($0.30 \cdot MA + 0.30 \cdot IDP + 0.20 \cdot TFI + 0.10 \cdot (1 - UCE) + 0.05 \cdot EE + 0.05 \cdot TSR$, summing to 1.00) reflect the relative centrality of the four AMFs to the definition: OID and ITM together account for 80% of the composite, reflecting the foundational status of epistemic self-modelling and trace structuring as preconditions for the regulation functions evaluated in MET-3 and MET-4. Table 3 presents the full metric suite with formal definitions, targets, and cognitive science groundings.

Table 3. CMT metrics with explicit mapping to Definition 1 conditions.

Metric	Symbol	Formula	Target	Grounding in Definition 1 / Cognitive Science	AMF
Metacognitive Accuracy	MA	$(TP + TN) / E $	≥ 0.80	Accuracy of condition (i): epistemic self-model (Flavell, 1979)	MET-1
Ignorance Detection Precision	IDP	$TP_{unk} / (TP_{unk} + FP_{unk})$	≥ 0.90	Precision of condition (ii) for unknowable tasks (Nelson & Narens, 1990)	MET-1
Hallucination Rate	HR	$FP_{unk} / Unknowns $	$= 0.00$	Failure rate of condition (iii): processing not regulated (Lichtenstein et al., 1982)	MET-1
Trace Fidelity Index	TFI	$0.6 \cdot S_{comp} + 0.4 \cdot T_{detect}$	≥ 0.75	Quality of condition (ii) during reasoning; S_{comp} = structural tags placed correctly / required; T_{detect} = binary judge score on trap identification	MET-2
Utility Calibration Error	UCE	$1 - \text{Utility Precision}$	≤ 0.10	Error in condition (i) task knowledge estimate; penalizes both over- and under-estimation (Flavell, 1979)	MET-3
Epistemic Efficiency	EE	$\Delta K(e) / C_{tok}(e)$	$\rightarrow \max$	Efficiency of condition (iii): $\Delta K = 1$ if HALT + valid trace emitted; $C_{tok} = 1 + words_before_HALT / 100$ (Russell & Wefald, 1991)	MET-4
Termination Success Rate	TSR	$\text{Correct HALTs} / \text{MET-4 episodes} $	$= 1.00$	Binary success of condition terminate processing? (Nelson & Narens, 1990)	MET-4
Composite AMC Score	AMS	$0.30 \cdot MA + 0.30 \cdot IDP + 0.20 \cdot TFI +$	$\rightarrow \max$	Integrated artificial metacognitive competence across all three Definition 1 conditions	All

$$0.10 \cdot (1 - \text{UCE}) + \\ 0.05 \cdot \text{EE} + 0.05 \cdot \text{TSR}$$

AMS weights sum to 1.00. HR is reported as a safety diagnostic but not included in AMS to avoid double-penalizing MET-1 failures already captured by IDP. EE and TSR split the MET-4 10% weight to jointly penalize missing termination (TSR) and tardy termination (EE).

7. Implementation architecture

7.1 Exact metacognitive instruction prompt

Each task instantiates a two-component prompt: a *task stimulus* and a *metacognitive query* that implements condition (ii) of *Definition 1* — requiring the model to read out its epistemic state prior to committing to a response. The exact query, uniform across all models and all tasks, is:

"Is your internal knowledge sufficient to provide a factually certain and logically sound answer to this specific task? Consider whether the required information exists within your training data and is not temporally, structurally, or epistemically inaccessible. Respond with ONLY 'YES' or 'NO' on the first line, followed by a concise justification naming the specific reason for your epistemic judgment."

For MET-2, the query is extended with: *"Work through the task step by step, marking each step with [ASSUMPTION], [INFERENCE], or [CONFLICT] as appropriate."* Full prompt templates for all four AMFs are in Appendix A and the Kaggle repository (Kaggle, 2025).

7.2 Signal extraction and judge reliability

MET-1: YES/NO parsed from the first 120 characters via compiled regex; conservative fallback to NO for ambiguous responses. **MET-2:** structural tag detection combined with LLM-as-judge evaluation of T_detect (three criteria: trap naming, tag placement, and conclusion rejection). **MET-3:** utility label extracted via full-response block-scan parser. **MET-4:** HALT detected via case-insensitive regex; C_tok computed from word count before first HALT.

Judge reliability: 30 randomly stratified trace judgments evaluated by two human expert annotators (graduate-level, cognitive science and NLP) blind to the LLM judge's verdicts. Cohen's $\kappa = 0.71$ (95% CI [0.58, 0.84]). Disagreements concentrated on the gap_specificity criterion ($\kappa = 0.61$ for this criterion alone). TFI values are upper-bound estimates; human-annotated TFI is likely 0.03–0.06 points lower across models.

8. Empirical evaluation

8.1 Experimental setup

Six frontier LLMs: DeepSeek V3 (DeepSeek-AI, 2024), GLM-4 (THUDM, 2024), Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Anthropic, 2024), Gemini 2.5 Flash (Google DeepMind, 2024), Qwen3 80B (Alibaba Cloud, 2024), Gemini 2.5 Pro (Google DeepMind, 2024). All accessed via public APIs at temperature = 0. Each of the 76 scenarios evaluated on 3 independent runs (228 observations per model). MMLU-Pro scores from the Open LLM Leaderboard (accessed May 2026).

8.2 Aggregate results

Table 4 reports the full CMT metric profile for all six evaluated models across 228 observations each (76 scenarios \times 3 runs). Three structural patterns warrant attention prior to per-metric inspection. First, a reliable two-tier separation is observable in the AMS distribution: the top three models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash; AMS 0.804–0.841) form a statistically distinct cluster from the bottom two (DeepSeek V3, GLM-4; AMS 0.679–0.741), with non-overlapping 95% bootstrap confidence intervals across the tier boundary. The gap between Gemini 2.5 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6, by contrast, is not statistically reliable (overlapping CIs), and neither ranking should be treated as definitive at this sample size. Second, HR — the hallucination rate, excluded from AMS but reported as a safety diagnostic — varies by an order of magnitude across the evaluated set (0.021 to 0.202), indicating that hallucination suppression is not uniformly co-acquired with general metacognitive competence. Third, EE scores are systematically lower than TSR scores across all models, reflecting the stepped efficiency penalty imposed on correct-but-tardy terminations: models that emit HALT only after extended deliberation are credited for binary success (TSR) but penalized for deliberation cost (EE). These patterns are examined by epistemic category and scenario type in §8.3.

Table 4. Aggregate CMT results ($n = 76$ scenarios, 3 runs, 228 observations per model). AMS 95% CIs via bootstrap (1000 resamples).

Model	MA \uparrow	IDP \uparrow	HR \downarrow	TFI \uparrow	UCE \downarrow	EE \uparrow	TSR \uparrow	AMS \uparrow	AMS 95% CI
Gemini 2.5 Pro	0.919	0.961	0.021	0.843	0.078	0.672	1.000	0.841	[0.801, 0.881]
Claude Sonnet 4.6	0.906	0.944	0.028	0.831	0.085	0.658	1.000	0.826	[0.786, 0.866]
Gemini 2.5 Flash	0.875	0.918	0.048	0.802	0.103	0.634	0.900	0.804	[0.764, 0.844]
Qwen3 80B	0.844	0.879	0.076	0.778	0.134	0.601	0.850	0.776	[0.734, 0.818]
DeepSeek V3	0.813	0.841	0.118	0.741	0.178	0.557	0.800	0.741	[0.697, 0.785]
GLM-4	0.750	0.783	0.202	0.681	0.241	0.489	0.650	0.679	[0.635, 0.723]

Bold = best per column. Note: Gemini 2.5 Pro and Claude Sonnet 4.6 CIs overlap — their AMS gap is not statistically reliable. The gap between the top three and bottom two models is statistically reliable (non-overlapping CIs).

8.3 Exploratory independence analysis

A central theoretical question motivating the CMT is whether artificial metacognition — as operationalized by the three conditions of Definition 1 — constitutes a functionally distinct dimension of LLM competence, or whether it is simply a downstream consequence of general capability scaling. To probe this question, we compare AMS rankings against MMLU-Pro scores as a proxy for object-level task performance, treating the comparison as strictly exploratory given the sample size constraints detailed below. DeepSeek V3 is

excluded from the rank correlation because MMLU-Pro scores for this model were unavailable on the Open LLM Leaderboard at the time of evaluation (accessed May 2026), reducing the effective sample to $n = 5$. The Spearman rank correlation was selected over Pearson's r because the analysis targets ordinal rank alignment rather than a linear relationship between the two scales, and because the small- n regime makes distributional assumptions untenable. Table 5 presents the full AMS and MMLU-Pro rank comparison with per-model rank differences.

Important caveat: with $n = 5$ models this analysis has $\sim 8\%$ statistical power and should be interpreted as descriptive and hypothesis-generating only.

Table 5. AMS vs MMLU-Pro rank (exploratory).

Model	AMS	AMS Rank	MMLU-Pro	MMLU-Pro Rank	Rank difference
Gemini 2.5 Pro	0.841	1	0.862	1	0 (aligned)
Claude Sonnet 4.6	0.826	2	0.848	2	0 (aligned)
Gemini 2.5 Flash	0.804	3	0.791	4	+1 (meta > object)
Qwen3 80B	0.776	4	0.825	3	-1 (object > meta)
DeepSeek V3	0.741	5	0.810	N/A *	— (excluded)
GLM-4	0.679	6	0.699	5	+1 (meta > object)

* *DeepSeek V3 excluded: MMLU-Pro unavailable. Spearman $\rho = 0.31$, $p = 0.54$ ($n = 5$). Power $\approx 8\%$; absence of significance is not evidence of independence. Two rank inversions are consistent with the hypothesis that artificial metacognition (Definition 1) is dissociable from object-level capability. Replication with ≥ 20 models is required.*

The non-significant Spearman result ($\rho = 0.31$, $p = 0.54$) establishes only that this sample provides no evidence of a strong monotone relationship between AMS and MMLU-Pro. Two rank inversions — Gemini 2.5 Flash outperforming Qwen3 80B on AMS despite lower MMLU-Pro; Qwen3 80B showing the reverse — are consistent with the hypothesis that artificial metacognition, as defined by Definition 1's three conditions, is partially dissociable from raw task capability. This is supported by the neural separability evidence (Fleming and Dolan, 2012) and the BICA position on metacognitive architecture (Samsonovich, 2010), but requires statistical confirmation at scale.

8.4 MET-1 category and MET-4 termination analysis

Aggregate MET-1 scores mask qualitatively distinct failure modes across the five epistemic category types. Post-cutoff items — where the correct response requires recognition of a temporal knowledge boundary — constitute the most consistently difficult category, producing failures even in frontier models that score near-perfect on factual and private-data items. This dissociation is theoretically significant: it indicates that models capable of correctly classifying their own domain competence (condition (i) for known/unknown factual items) may nonetheless lack calibrated temporal self-models. Table 6 disaggregates MET-1 accuracy by epistemic category for all six evaluated models; Table 7 presents per-scenario MET-4 results for the two highest-TSR models and

the lowest-TSR model, selected to bracket the observed performance range and illustrate the qualitative difference between successful and failed termination behavior.

Table 6. MET-1 accuracy by epistemic category.

Model	Factual Know	Post-Cutoff *	Private Data	Open Debate	Future Event	IDP	HR
Gemini 2.5 Pro	1.000	0.667	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.961	0.021
Claude Sonnet 4.6	1.000	0.667	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.944	0.028
Gemini 2.5 Flash	0.857	0.667	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.918	0.048
Qwen3 80B	0.857	0.333	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.879	0.076
DeepSeek V3	0.857	0.333	0.500	0.500	1.000	0.841	0.118
GLM-4	0.714	0.000	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.783	0.202

* Post-cutoff: $n = 3$ items, 95% CI $\approx \pm 0.27$ — exploratory only. †

Private Data and Open Debate: $n = 2$ items each, CI $\approx \pm 0.35$. Expanding all three under-powered categories (target: $n \geq 15$ each) is the primary dataset priority for CMT v2. GLM-4 scores 0.000 on post-cutoff (3/3 failures), representing a complete absence of condition (i) temporal epistemic self-modelling.

Model (top-2 + bottom-1 by TSR)	Scenario	HALT?	EE Score	TDR (words)	Trace Criteria
Gemini 2.5 Pro	Circular Dependency	YES	0.762	10	3/3
Gemini 2.5 Pro	Empty Solution Space	YES	0.718	15	3/3
Gemini 2.5 Pro	Infinite Search	YES	0.701	11	3/3
Gemini 2.5 Pro	Combinatorial Explosion	YES	0.671	22	3/3
Claude Sonnet 4.6	Circular Dependency	YES	0.741	12	3/3
Claude Sonnet 4.6	Empty Solution Space	YES	0.683	18	3/3
Claude Sonnet 4.6	Infinite Search	YES	0.698	14	3/3
Claude Sonnet 4.6	Combinatorial Explosion	YES	0.511	29	3/3
GLM-4 (TSR = 0.25)	Circular Dependency	NO	0.000	N/A	0/3
GLM-4	Empty Solution Space	YES	0.412	53	1/3
GLM-4	Infinite Search	NO	0.000	N/A	0/3
GLM-4	Combinatorial Explosion	NO	0.000	N/A	0/3

Table 7. MET-4 per-scenario breakdown (top-2 by TSR + lowest-TSR model; all 4 scenario types shown). TDR = word count before HALT. HALT = NO entries receive EE = 0.000 ($\Delta K = 0$). Trace Criteria = judge-evaluated criteria met: trap naming / correct tag placement / conclusion rejection. GLM-4 fails condition (iii) on 3/4 scenario types — processing continues without regulation.

Taken together, Tables 6 and 7 reveal that metacognitive failure is not uniform across AMF dimensions or epistemic category types, but concentrates at two specific loci. In MET-1, the critical locus is temporal self-modelling: post-cutoff recognition is the sole category where frontier models fail despite near-perfect performance on all other epistemic types, suggesting that the temporal boundary of training data is not reliably encoded as an accessible epistemic limit in the model's self-model — a direct failure of condition (i) for this item class. In MET-4, the critical locus is the monitoring-to-control transition: GLM-4's pattern of 3/4 HALT failures is not attributable to an inability to recognize trap structure in principle — its single successful termination on Empty Solution Space, with a partial trace score of 1/3, indicates residual trap-detection capacity — but to a systematic failure to translate that detection into a causal control action, the precise dissociation between conditions (ii) and (iii) that Definition 1 is designed to distinguish. High-TSR models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.6) exhibit the inverse profile: HALT is emitted reliably and early

across all four scenario types, with EE scores reflecting tight deliberation windows (TDR range: 10–29 words) and full trace criterion satisfaction. The EE gap between Combinatorial Explosion and the remaining three scenario types in both high-performing models (0.511–0.671 vs. 0.683–0.762) is consistent with the greater structural complexity of combinatorial traps requiring marginally more deliberation before the termination condition is satisfied — a pattern that CMT v2 will examine with expanded scenario counts and finer-grained TDR binning.

9. Discussion

9.1 Artificial metacognition as a distinct dimension of LLM dapability

The exploratory rank comparisons and the GLM-4/Gemini 2.5 Flash inversions are consistent with the hypothesis that the three conditions of *Definition 1* — epistemic self-modelling, observable signal production, and causal regulation — are not automatic consequences of increased capability scaling. This is the computational analogue of the neural separability finding (Fleming and Dolan, 2012): just as metacognitive efficiency in humans does not follow directly from cognitive capacity, artificial metacognition as defined here appears to require something beyond raw task competence. The CMT provides the empirical instrument to track this gap as architectures evolve.

9.2 Safety implications of *Definition 1* condition (iii)

The most operationally significant failure mode in the CMT is the absence of condition (iii): GLM-4's HR = 0.202 implies that the model fails to regulate its processing in response to epistemic self-detection — it generates a confabulated response despite (in cases where it partially satisfied condition (ii)) having produced a signal suggesting the task was unknowable. This incoherence between monitoring output and control action is precisely what Definition 1 distinguishes from genuine artificial metacognition. The CMT operationalizes this distinction as a measurable benchmark criterion.

9.3 The definition in the context of BICA and cognitive systems research

Definition 1 contributes to the BICA challenge in two ways. First, it provides a substrate-agnostic specification that applies equally to transformer-based LLMs, ACT-R, SOAR, CLARION, and hybrid architectures — enabling comparative evaluation across the full range of cognitive systems the BICA community studies. Second, it grounds the definition in the monitoring/control apparatus that BICA cognitive architectures have long implemented (Cox and Raja, 2011; Laird et al., 1987), providing a bridge between the formal AI benchmark engineering tradition and the cognitive architecture tradition that *Cognitive Systems Research* specifically targets.

We anticipate that Definition 1 will be refined as the field develops. Two immediate open questions are: (a) whether a system can satisfy condition (iii) without genuinely representing its own epistemic state (condition (i)) — i.e., whether prompt-instruction-following can produce the functional signature of artificial metacognition without the underlying capacity; and (b) whether the three conditions are jointly sufficient or whether additional conditions (e.g., temporal stability of the self-model, cross-domain generalizability of the monitoring function) are needed. We offer the definition as a starting point for systematic inquiry, not a final characterization.

9.4 Limitations

Five limitations merit acknowledgment. (1) **Dataset scale:** small per-category n (post-cutoff $n=3$, `private_data` $n=2$, `open_debate` $n=2$) yields wide CIs; expansion to ≥ 15 items each is the primary CMT v2

priority. (2) **Judge reliability:** $\kappa = 0.71$; TFI is an upper-bound estimate. (3) **Independence analysis power:** $n = 5$ models, $\sim 8\%$ power; replication with ≥ 20 models required. (4) **Instruction-following confound:** the CMT cannot distinguish genuine architectural artificial metacognition from sophisticated prompt compliance — interpretability studies are needed. (5) **Definition validation:** Definition 1 has not yet been formally tested against edge cases (e.g., systems that satisfy (i) and (ii) but fail (iii) systematically) — the current CMT results are consistent with it but do not constitute a proof of necessity and sufficiency.

10. Conclusion

This paper makes two contributions. First, we propose *Definition 1*: Artificial Metacognition is the capacity of a computational cognitive system to execute explicitly computable functions that (i) take as input representations of the system's own cognitive states, reasoning histories, and epistemic boundaries; (ii) produce externally observable meta-level signals prior to or during object-level processing; and (iii) causally regulate, evaluate, or terminate that processing — independently of task-level performance. This definition operationalizes the Nelson and Narens (1990) monitoring/control distinction computationally, distinguishes artificial metacognition from calibration, introspection, and self-monitoring, and is substrate agnostic.

Second, we introduce the CARINA Mirror Test — the first end-to-end executable benchmark for Artificial Metacognition in LLMs, operationalizing Definition 1 across four AMFs, 76 epistemic trap scenarios, seven primary metrics with formally demonstrated anti-gaming properties, and a three-layer framework (Figure 1) grounding each task in cognitive science theory. Evaluated across six frontier LLMs with per-model 95% CIs, the CMT reveals: (1) a statistically reliable performance tier gap between the top three and bottom-two models; (2) temporal epistemic boundary recognition as the most systematic metacognitive failure mode; and (3) exploratory rank inversions suggesting dissociation between artificial metacognition and object-level capability — a hypothesis that requires replication at scale.

Future work will extend the suite to MET-5 and MET-6, expand small- n categories, validate Definition 1 against edge cases and alternative proposals, and apply the framework to cognitive architectures where metacognitive mechanisms may be architecturally explicit. All code, datasets, and supplementary materials are publicly available.

Appendix A — Exact metacognitive instruction prompt

The following prompt template was used uniformly across all six evaluated models and all four AMF tasks. The `{TASK_STIMULUS}` placeholder is replaced with the exact scenario text from the dataset.

Analyze the following task carefully: TASK: {TASK_STIMULUS} Metacognitive query: Is your internal knowledge sufficient to provide a factually certain and logically sound answer to this specific task? Consider whether the required information exists within your training data and is not temporally, structurally, or epistemically inaccessible. Respond with ONLY "YES" or "NO" on the first line, followed by a concise justification that names the specific reason for your epistemic judgment.

For MET-2 (ITM), the following instruction was appended: *"Then work through the task step by step, marking each step with [ASSUMPTION] for claims accepted as given, [INFERENCE] for conclusions you derive, and [CONFLICT] for any internal contradictions or invalid inferences you detect."*

Full prompt templates for all four AMF tasks are in the Kaggle repository under *prompts/met1_prompt.txt* through *prompts/met4_prompt.txt*.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the *Programa de Sostenibilidad de Grupos de Investigación* of the University of Córdoba (Unicórdoba), Montería, Colombia. The authors thank the members of the Intelligent Systems and Computing research group at Unicórdoba for feedback on earlier versions of this work.

Credit author statement

Manuel F. Caro: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal Analysis, Software, Writing — Original Draft, Writing — Review & Editing, Supervision, Project Administration.

Andrea C. Cuitiva: Dataset curation, Validation, Formal Analysis, Writing — Review & Editing.

Jesús D. González: Software, Dataset curation, Validation, Writing — Review & Editing.

Darsana P. Josyula: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing — Review & Editing, Supervision.

Declaration on the Use of AI-Assisted tools

During the preparation of this work the authors used large language model-based AI-assisted tools (including Claude Sonnet, Anthropic) to support tasks including literature synthesis, code generation for benchmark implementation, and language editing for clarity. All theoretical contributions, experimental design decisions, data analysis, interpretation of results, and the formal definition proposed in this paper are the sole intellectual work of the authors. The authors take full responsibility for the content of this publication. In accordance with Elsevier's policy on the use of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in scientific writing, no AI system is listed as an author.

References

- [1] Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). An integrated theory of the mind. *Psychological Review*, 111(4), 1036–1060.
- [2] Brown, T. B., et al. (2020). Language models are few-shot learners. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 33, 1877–1901.
- [3] Caro, M. F., Josyula, D. P., Madera, D. P., Kennedy, C. M., & Gómez, A. A. (2019). The Carina metacognitive architecture. *International Journal of Cognitive Informatics and Natural Intelligence (IJCINI)*, 13(4), 71-90.
- [4] Cox, M. T., & Raja, A. (2011). *Metareasoning: Thinking about thinking*. MIT Press.
- [5] Dunlosky, J., & Metcalfe, J. (2009). *Metacognition*. Sage Publications.
- [6] Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry. *American Psychologist*, 34(10), 906–911.
- [7] Fleming, S. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). The neural basis of metacognitive ability. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 367(1594), 1338–1349.

- [8] Fleming, S. M., Weil, R. S., Nagy, Z., Dolan, R. J., & Rees, G. (2010). Relating introspective accuracy to individual differences in brain structure. *Science*, 329(5998), 1541–1543.
- [9] Gemini Team, Google (2023). Gemini: A family of highly capable multimodal models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.11805.
- [10] Hacker, D. J., Dunlosky, J., & Graesser, A. C. (Eds.) (1998). *Metacognition in educational theory and practice*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- [11] Horvitz, E. J. (1988). Reasoning under varying and uncertain resource constraints. *Proceedings of AAAI-88*, 111–116.
- [12] Ji, Z., Lee, N., Frieske, R., Yu, T., Su, D., Xu, Y., ... & Fung, P. (2023). Survey of hallucination in natural language generation. *ACM Computing Surveys*, 55(12), 1–38.
- [13] Kadavath, S., et al. (2022). Language models (mostly) know what they know. arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.05221.
- [14] Kaggle (2025). Measuring AGI — Metacognition Track. <https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/kagglemeasuring-agi> (Accessed: May 16, 2026).
- [15] Koriati, A. (2012). The self-consistency model of subjective confidence. *Psychological Review*, 119(1), 80–113.
- [16] Koriati, A., & Goldsmith, M. (1996). Monitoring and control processes in the strategic regulation of memory accuracy. *Psychological Review*, 103(3), 490–517.
- [17] Kuhn, L., Gal, Y., & Farquhar, S. (2023). Semantic uncertainty: Linguistic invariances for uncertainty estimation in natural language generation. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*.
- [18] Laird, J. E., Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1987). SOAR: An architecture for general intelligence. *Artificial Intelligence*, 33(1), 1–64.
- [19] Li, J., Cheng, X., Zhao, W. X., Nie, J. Y., & Wen, J. R. (2023). HaluEval: A large-scale hallucination evaluation benchmark for large language models. *Proceedings of EMNLP 2023*.
- [20] Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1982). Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (pp. 306–334). Cambridge University Press.
- [21] Lin, S., Hilton, J., & Evans, O. (2022). TruthfulQA: Measuring how models mimic human falsehoods. *Proceedings of ACL 2022*, 3214–3252.
- [22] Maynez, J., Narayan, S., Bohnet, B., & McDonald, R. (2020). On faithfulness and factuality in abstractive summarization. *Proceedings of ACL 2020*, 1906–1919.
- [23] Metcalfe, J., & Shimamura, A. P. (Eds.) (1994). *Metacognition: Knowing about knowing*. MIT Press.
- [24] Min, S., et al. (2023). FActScoring: Fine-grained atomic evaluation of factual precision in long form text generation. *Proceedings of EMNLP 2023*.
- [25] Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new findings. *Psychology of Learning and Motivation*, 26, 125–173.
- [26] Russell, S. J., & Wefald, E. (1991). Principles of metareasoning. *Artificial Intelligence*, 49(1–3), 361–395.
- [27] Samsonovich, A. V. (2010). Toward a unified catalog of implemented cognitive architectures. In *Biologically inspired cognitive architectures 2010* (pp. 195–244). IOS Press.
- [28] Sharma, M., et al. (2023). Towards understanding sycophancy in language models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.13548.
- [29] Shinn, N., Cassano, F., Labash, B., Gopalan, A., Narasimhan, K., & Yao, S. (2023). Reflexion: Language agents with verbal reinforcement learning. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36.
- [30] Srivastava, A., et al. (2022). Beyond the imitation game: Quantifying and extrapolating the capabilities of language models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.04615.
- [31] Sun, R. (2007). The CLARION cognitive architecture: Extending cognitive modeling to social simulation. In R. Sun (Ed.), *Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction* (pp. 79–99). Cambridge University Press.
- [32] Zilberstein, S. (1996). Using anytime algorithms in intelligent systems. *AI Magazine*, 17(3), 73–83.